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Legislating Religious Freedom: An Example 
of Muslim Marriages in South Africa  
 
WAHEEDA AMIEN† AND ANNIE LEATT (DHAMMAMEGHĀ) ††  
 
INTRODUCTION 
For the past 27 years, diverse groups of Muslims have lobbied 
for the legalization of Muslim marriages in South Africa and for the 
codification of elements of Muslim Personal Law (MPL). MPL is an 
Islamic-based private law system comprising family law and 
inheritance. Perhaps surprisingly, certain ulamā bodies (Muslim 
religious bodies or clergy)1 and gender activists have supported draft 
legislation for the recognition of Muslim marriages under the 
enabling provisions of the final Constitution of South Africa 1996, 
though for quite different reasons. Yet, despite successive proposals, 
widespread consultation within the Muslim community, and two draft 
Muslim marriage bills, Muslim marriages are still not recognized in 
South Africa.  
This contribution presents some background to efforts to 
recognize Muslim marriages and provides an overview of elements of 
the 2010 Muslim Marriages Bill (MMB) currently under 
consideration. The contribution places recognition efforts in the 
context of an internally diverse Muslim community. It also lays out 
some important resources for understanding what is at stake in the 
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1. Ulamā literally means “learned ones,” and it refers to a body of Muslim 
clergy. They usually include men trained in the seminaries of the Middle East, the 
India-Pakistan subcontinent, and locally. Ebrahim Moosa, Shaping Muslim Law in 
South Africa: Future and Prospects, in THE OTHER LAW: NON-STATE ORDERING IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 125, 125 (Wilfried Schärf & Daniel Nina eds., 2001). 
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recognition of Muslim marriages, and why, despite considerable 
effort, this has not yet been possible in South Africa.  
In doing so, we seek to highlight some of the tensions involved 
in an effort that seeks to afford legal recognition to a religious 
marriage within a secular legal framework. We ask: how it is possible 
to develop law that adjudicates equality between religious groups in a 
newly secular society, and equality between different members of 
religious communities, particularly between Muslim men and 
women? We address the question of authority and choice within a 
religious community: how can law work with tensions between 
individuals and religious leaders as interpreters and active agents of 
religiously sanctioned marriages? What constitutes a religious 
community? A legal specialist? An appropriate arbiter and a 
spokesperson for the religious tradition? And how, in a country like 
South Africa with multiple and parallel marriage legislation, do legal 
drafters engage with tensions between religious and secular 
interpretations of marriage in the context of a Bill of Rights?  
The draft legislation on Muslim marriages raises complex 
questions about representation, interpretation, and equality in 
attempts to enact religious freedom in law in a secular and liberal 
context. It shows how law-making is at once both a legal and social 
process. And it demonstrates that law making is not only about the 
recognition of religious mores and sanctions, but also about its 
reformulation through codification and arbitration. The contribution 
therefore provides background, resources, commentary, and extracts 
from the South African Constitution and draft legislation on Muslim 
marriages to study as a case for the politics of religious freedom. 
I.    A BRIEF HISTORY OF RELIGION, POLITICS, AND RULE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
South Africa is the site of a long and complex history of 
entanglement between religion, tradition, and political rule. Until the 
transition of the 1990s, South Africa was not secular. Despite their 
many differences, successive regimes of white colonial and apartheid 
government made use of Christian political theologies and traditional 
authority to secure white rule without democratic legitimacy.  
South Africa is furthermore a country with significant religious 
diversity and high levels of religious adherence. In addition to the 
religiosity of precolonial Southern Africa and the Christianity 
introduced by Europeans and missionaries, political prisoners, slaves, 
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indentured labourers, and people fleeing persecution brought a range 
of religions to Southern Africa.2  Demographic data on religion in 
South Africa is thin. The best source is the 2001 Census.3 According 
to this data, Christianity is by far the biggest religion, with 
approximately 78% adherence. Christian religiosity is very diverse 
and can be aggregated under mainline Protestant, Reformed, Roman 
Catholic, African Independent, and Pentecostal Charismatic 
Churches. Fifteen percent of the population report that they have “no 
religion.” In 2001, Muslims made up about 1.5% of the South 
African population or around 650,000 people. They therefore 
comprise the biggest religious minority.4  There were also 550,000 
Hindus and about 75,000 Jews. A catch-all category of “other faiths,” 
including “Buddhist Taoist, New Age, Jehovah’s Witness and 
Baha’i” was selected by nearly 300,000 people. Furthermore, 
126,000 people identified as having “African Traditional Belief,” and 
1.4% of the population refused to answer the religion question.5  
During the colonial period, the policy of indirect rule was 
introduced for the indigenous African population who comprised the 
majority of South Africans living in what were first called reserves 
and then “homelands.”6 They were permitted to live only under a 
self-governing system in those homelands, which made up a 
miniscule fraction of the land area of the country. During that 
process, African customary practices were codified as Customary 
Law by British administrators from 1878.  
Other systems of law—including those adhered to by Muslims, 
Hindus and Jews—were left to operate in a parallel and private 
sphere. Where “non-Christian” systems of law appeared in public 
                                                            
2. FUNSO S. AFOLAYAN, CULTURE & CUSTOMS OF SOUTH AFRICA 57–83 
(2004) (setting out the various religious influences in South Africa). Cf. 
CHRISTIANITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL HISTORY 
(Richard Elphick & Rodney Davenport eds., 1997) (charting the history of 
Christian influences in South Africa). 
3. See STATISTICS S. AFR., CENSUS 2001: PRIMARY TABLES SOUTH AFRICA: 
CENSUS ’96 AND 2001 COMPARED 24–28 (2001),  available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/census01/html/RSAPrimary.pdf (reporting the census 
results pertaining to religion). Questions about religion have since been taken out of 
the Census instruments. 
4. All figures for the “minority religions” should be treated with caution since 
sampling errors are likely to be greatest where the population proportion is so low 
and where migrants and foreign nationals were considerably undercounted. 
5. STATISTICS S. AFR., supra note 3, at 24–25. Calculations were done by Leatt 
using simple descriptive statistical techniques. 
6. J.C. MEYERS, INDIRECT RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA: TRADITION, MODERNITY 
AND THE COSTUMING OF POLITICAL POWER 1–16 (2008). 
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debates, they became subject to a Calvinist form of moralizing 
around gender and polygyny. In fact, the state did not recognize 
Muslim marriages because, being potentially polygynous, they were 
not held to conform to the “Christian requisite of monogamy.”7  
In many respects, religious and racial discrimination overlapped 
in South African history. Religious leaders took part in racial 
governance as well as in opposition. In 1948, the National Party (NP) 
came to power in a whites-only election and introduced the policy of 
apartheid with racial segregation and legally codified white 
domination.8 In 1960, 69 black people in a rally protesting the 
infamous pass laws were reportedly shot by the police in the 
Sharpeville Massacre.9 The white referendum that was then proposed 
by the NP led to a declaration of independence from Britain. 
Afterwards, the South African state was more able to pursue its racist 
policies unhindered. During that decade, the apartheid state reached 
the height of its powers and ambitions.10 The government launched a 
concerted campaign against political opposition by the African 
National Congress (ANC), the Black Consciousness movement, and 
the Pan African Congress. It also took control over many of the 
previously mission run schools and instituted Christian National 
Education, which differentiated curriculum, teacher training, and 
school resources by race according to the apartheid classifications: 
Black, Coloured, Indian, and White. Some privately-funded Jewish 
and Muslim schools were established to provide an alternative. 
However, on the whole, Hindu and Muslim children were educated in 
a Christian context in Coloured and Indian schools. The political 
theology of apartheid revolved around a Christian God that 
differentiated between the country’s inhabitants by race and culture. 
                                                            
7. In Ismail v. Ismail, 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A), the Supreme Court during the 
apartheid era confirmed that Muslim marriages were precluded from legal 
recognition because their potentially polygynous nature offended the public policy 
or boni mores of that time, which was informed by a Christian ethos. Waheeda 
Amien, Overcoming the Conflict between the Right to Freedom of Religion and 
Women’s Rights to Equality: A South African Case Study of Muslim Marriages. 28 
HUM. RTS. Q. 729, 733 (2006) (quoting Ismail v. Ismail, 1983 (1) SA 1006 (AD) at 
1024E, 1025G (S. Afr.)). 
8. LEONARD M. THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 87–90 (2000). 
9. Id. at 210; WILLIAM BEINART, TWENTIETH CENTURY SOUTH AFRICA 166–67 
(2001). 
10. E.g., Deborah Posel, The Apartheid Project, 1948–1970, in 2 THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA: 1885-1994 319–68. (Robert Ross et al., 
eds., 2011). 
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The preamble of the 1961 Constitution quite literally asserted that 
God gave South Africa to whites: White responsibility to God was to 
stand united to safeguard “the integrity of the country,” secure “law 
and order,” and “further the contentment and spiritual and material 
welfare of all in our midst.”11  
Increased repression led to increased struggle against the state. 
Opposition groups radicalized, established bases in exile, and some 
took up armed struggle. Within the country, youth protest increased. 
The 1976 Soweto Uprising was a response to the plan to introduce 
Afrikaans as the medium of instruction for black African children.12 
The state’s actions became increasingly extreme with bannings, 
arrests, and extra-judicial killings.13 In the 1980s, successive states of 
emergency were declared in which police and security apparatuses 
gained almost unfettered freedom to act against opponents of the 
state.14 As more political leaders of the opposition were banned, 
incarcerated, killed, or went into exile, religious leaders took up more 
public roles in the struggle. Archbishop Tutu and the Reverand Allan 
Boesak are probably the best known of these, though they were part 
of a broader progressive ANC-aligned interfaith movement that 
participated in the United Democratic Front (UDF). Muslim leaders 
also participated in the struggle against apartheid, notably Imam 
Abdullah Haron who was murdered by the apartheid state in 1969. 
The Muslim Youth Movement (MYM), which continues to function 
today as a progressive Muslim-based organization in South Africa, 
was also active in the struggle against apartheid.15 
   While military and police repression increased, the apartheid 
state strategically increased its divide and rule efforts among black 
people by introducing the Tricameral Parliament in 1983.16 The 
Tricameral Parliament was an attempt to co-opt Coloured and Indian 
leaders into “power-sharing” by giving them representation in second 
class houses of parliament while maintaining a white majority in the 
main house. Black Africans were excluded from this initiative. The 
                                                            
11. REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. CONST., Apr. 24, 1961, Act 32 of 1961, pmbl. 
12. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 212; HERMANN BUHR GILIOMEE & BERNARD 
MBENGA, NEW HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 362–63 (2007). 
13. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 212–13. 
14. See id. at 236 (“South Africa’s destabilizing tactics between 1980 and 1989 
led to the deaths of one million people [and] made a further three million 
homeless.”). 
15. About Us, MUSLIM YOUTH MOVEMENT, 
http://mym.za.org/index.php/about-us.html (last visited May 8, 2014). 
16. MARINA OTTAWAY, SOUTH AFRICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW ORDER 
24–25 (1993). 
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black majority comprising black African, Coloured, and Indian 
people protested against the establishment of the Tricameral 
Parliament and boycotted its elections. They saw the initiative for 
what it was: another attempt to manipulate black South Africans. 
Consequently, the tricameral elections inspired “only 13 and 18 
percent voter turnout respectively,”17 and as result, some Hindu and 
Muslim people were present for the first time in lower houses of 
parliament. Given that, the 1983 South African Constitution of the 
apartheid government sought to acknowledge some equivalence of 
religions under the authorization of the Christian God. This was 
incorporated into an utterly incoherent statement that speaks of 
responsibility towards God and man, and the necessity of pursuing 
national goals of upholding “Christian values and civilized norms, 
with recognition and protection of freedom of faith and worship” and 
the “self-determination of population groups and peoples.”18  
In 1987, in the context of the abovementioned dual strategy of 
the apartheid state, the South African Law Commission (SALC) 
initiated an investigation into Muslim marriages. Ulamā bodies in 
South Africa had occasionally lobbied for legal recognition of MPL 
under apartheid. While some of the ulamā supported the work of the 
SALC, many Muslims affiliated with the anti-apartheid struggle, such 
as the MYM and anti-apartheid activist members of the ulamā, were 
suspicious of the initiative.19 Hence, nothing further came of that 
attempt.  
II.   CONSTITUTING SECULARISM IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA  
       South Africa is rightly famous for its negotiated transition during 
which apartheid and opposition forces reached agreements that 
encouraged the National Party (NP) to step down and the African 
National Congress (ANC) to assume power. The negotiations took 
the form of agreements on practical arrangements for government 
and drafting a new Constitution. The new Constitution captured the 
aspirations for democracy, representation, and equality, and it also 
safeguarded cultural and linguistic rights, private property and 
business, and financial stability. Although covert military and 
                                                            
17. BEINART, supra note 9, at 255. 
18. REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. CONST., Sept. 22, 1983, Act 110 of 1983, pmbl. 
19. See Ebrahim Moosa, Prospects for Muslim Law in South Africa: A History 
and Recent Developments, in 3 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 130, 135 (1996) 
(noting that many within the Muslim community suspected that purchasing 
legitimacy was the SALC’s motivation for the initiative). 
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policing operations continued during this time, the transition was able 
to prevent the escalation of the violence of the 1980s into a full scale 
civil war.   
Everything was up for negotiation, and the legal and political 
status of religion changed dramatically during the transition period. 
The 1996 South African Constitution is now secular in as much as it 
promises the right to religious freedom and religious equality and 
makes legal provision for the relationships between state and religion. 
It has destroyed the edifice of Christian political theology and the 
unique place Christianity had under apartheid. It also offers the 
promise of dignity, recognition, and the protection and exercise of 
religious freedom for all South Africans. What this means in practice 
is still being worked out in society, law, and jurisprudence. 
The rights entrenched in the new Constitution are basically 
liberal in form; they are mainly oriented to the rights of individuals. 
The various conglomerations of apartheid power—the NP, those 
further to the right of Afrikaner politics, and some of the leaders of 
homelands—all sought protection for group rights under the rubric of 
consociationalism and group, rather than individual, political 
representation. As a second prize, they were willing to accept a 
strongly federal arrangement that retained some special race 
majorities in certain areas. The ANC in contrast was set on winning 
the basic rights of representative democracy with one person one 
vote. They sought a dispensation in which citizens would be 
recognized as having political equality in a state that could work to 
secure social and economic equality. To do so, they prioritized 
individual rights in legal drafting and negotiations, even as they 
furthered the rhetoric of people’s power on the streets. The liberal 
aspirations are largely captured in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights, 
sections of which are discussed below.   
In the transition, religion was not a particularly contentious 
issue. Debates about the future of religion were held between the 
ANC, NP, and other smaller parties, and they were informed by an 
interfaith body through the World Conference on Religion and Peace 
(WCRP) that coordinated submissions and perspectives from a wide 
range of progressive Christian and Muslim groups. In addition, many 
religious individuals or groups wrote to the Constitutional Assembly 
or lobbied the parties to the negotiations. On the whole, there was 
considerable consensus within the formal negotiating process about 
the importance of recognizing religious diversity, the principle of 
freedom of religion, and the significance of religious practice to most 
South Africans.  
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There are a number of areas in which legal provisions about 
religion are found in the Constitution. The bedrock of these are 
contained inter alia in the equality provision (section 9), the 
individual right to freedom of religion (section 15), and the collective 
right to freedom of religion (section 31). 
 The equality provision states: 
9 (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the 
right to equal protection and benefit of the law. 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of 
all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement 
of equality, legislative and other measures designed to 
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or 
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth.  
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or 
directly against anyone on one or more grounds in 
terms of subsection (3). 
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds 
listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established 
that the discrimination is fair.20 
Importantly, section 9(3) promises protection from 
discrimination on the basis of religion and belief, as well as on the 
basis of sex, gender, and sexuality. As in most constitutional 
dispensations with a Bill of Rights, potentially conflicting rights and 
protections are enshrined. For instance, the collective right to 
freedom of religion in section 31 can potentially conflict with section 
9(3). As we will show, this conflict is illustrated in the Muslim 
Marriages Bill (MMB). Section 31 reads: 
31  (1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or 
linguistic community may not be denied the right, 
with other members of that community –  
                                                            
20. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 9. 
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(a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion 
and use their language; and, 
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural, 
religious and linguistic associations and other 
organs of civil society.  
(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised 
in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill 
of Rights.21   
Significantly, section 31(2) will most likely provide the balance 
needed to prevent a discriminatory religious practice from being 
lawfully sanctioned. It appears to create the potential to subordinate 
religious rights to, for example, equality. For instance, a practice 
authorized by a sacred text or religious authority that discriminates 
unfairly on the basis of gender, sex, or sexuality, will most likely not 
be upheld in the event of a court challenge. 
 The transition founded a new political community that was, 
for the first time, not racially legislated. Many of the events and 
symbols of the nation-building that accompanied the transition were 
secular in form and content. They included ushering in the new 
Constitution, the 1994 elections, the inauguration of Nelson Mandela, 
and his personification of inclusive reconciliation. Where religious 
leaders were present at important ceremonial events to found the new 
nation, including Mandela’s inauguration and the opening of the first 
democratic Parliament, great care was taken to have those events 
blessed by religious leaders from a wide range of faiths and 
denominations.  
 Yet, the rhetorical and performative creation of a national 
community also required some sort of revisiting of the past. It is in 
relation to this most painful and antagonistic past that Christianity, as 
the majority religion and as a common language of reconciliation, 
was brought into use in the political process. In the process of the 
Truth and Reconcialiation Commission (TRC) and in nation-building 
discourse, Christian notions of reconciliation, liberation, and 
forgiveness were mobilized. In fact, given the largely Christian 
population in South Africa, themes and images from Christianity 
continue to infuse public and political culture.  
 While section 31 protects the collective right of “persons 
belonging to a religious community” to “practice their religion” and 
                                                            
21. Id. § 31. 
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“form, join and maintain religious associations,” section 15 protects 
the individual right to freedom of religion. Section 15, which is titled 
“Freedom of Religion, Belief and Opinion,” includes three sections.22 
The first was introduced early in the negotiation process and was 
maintained in the 1996 Constitution as a general formulation of the 
right to religion. Section 15 (1) states, “Everyone has the right to 
freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.”23 
The technical legal drafting teams in 1993 noted that all parties 
agreed that religion formed part of a basic set of first generation 
rights that were “minimal or essential rights and freedoms.”24 
Recognized as comprising an international rights standard, it formed 
common ground among the main negotiating parties. 
Unlike in the United States, however, the negotiating parties in 
South Africa conceived a relationship of cooperation between state 
and religious groups. They decided against a strict wall of separation 
between religious and state institutions. Political and religious groups 
agreed that their institutions should be separated for their mutual and 
common good, but that separation should not be so strict as to 
preclude their cooperation or the presence of religious observance in 
state and state-aided institutions.  
Very different rationales informed this consensus. Some were 
explicitly religious, others political. All parties agreed that South 
Africa is a religious country, that there is religious diversity, and that, 
unlike in the past, there must be a place for all religions in the new 
society.25 They also agreed that the area of operation of religious 
institutions should not be less than that of Calvinist Christianity under 
apartheid. Religious clergy and observance should still be present in 
                                                            
22. Id. § 15. 
23. Id. § 15(1). 
24. See TECHNICAL COMM. ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DURING THE 
TRANSITION, SUMMARY OF THE FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL 
COMMITTEE ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE TRANSITION 2–5 (May 14, 1993), 
available at http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/3201.PDF (including “Freedom of 
conscience, religion, thought and belief” in the category of “Minimal or essential 
rights and freedoms which must be accommodated”). 
25. E.g. Nat’l Party, National Party Preliminary Submission to Theme 
Committee Four on Freedom of Religion, CONSTITUTIONNET, 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/3016.PDF (last visited June 28, 2014); Afr. 
Christian Democratic Party, African Christian Democratic Party Submission to 
Theme Committee Four on Freedom of Religion, CONSTITUTIONNET, 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/3006.PDF (last visited June 28, 2014). 
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schools, prisons, hospital chaplaincies, and in public broadcasting. 
However, the terms of their presence were altered to include the full 
range of religions. By consensus, institutional Christianity lost its 
monopoly on the state and state-aided institutions. This was 
formulated in the following way in the 1996 Constitution:  
15 (2) Religious observances may be conducted at 
state or state-aided institutions, provided that –  
(a) those observances follow rules made by the 
appropriate public authorities; 
(b) they are conducted on an equitable basis, 
and; 
 (c) attendance at them is free and voluntary.26 
 Prior to the enactment of the 1996 Constitution, there was 
some debate about who should have the authority to determine the 
rules for religious co-existence and practice in state institutions. In 
draft form, section 15(2)(a) referred only to “appropriate 
authorities.”27 A Constitutional Assembly Public Hearing in May 
1995 provided a chance for religious groups to elaborate on who 
would have such authority.28 The overwhelming consensus among 
religious groups, endorsed by the WCRP, was that religious bodies 
should retain autonomy over religious observances, even when they 
were in state institutions. Religious bodies envisaged an interlocutory 
interfaith body, controlled by religious groups, which could advise 
government on religious matters.  
 Religious groups had no leverage over the decision on an 
appropriate authority when it was finally made. In April 1996, at the 
very end of the negotiations, the ANC and the NP met to negotiate 
deadlocked issues in bilateral conversation.29 The NP wanted to make 
sure that, in schools particularly, the appropriate authority would be 
the school governing body.30 They hoped to retain the Christian 
                                                            
26. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 15(2). 
27. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993 § 13. 
28. S. Afr. Constitutional Assembly Public Hearing on Religion (1995) 
(transcipt on file at S. Afr. Nat’l Archives CA F4 1/12/6). 
29. See PENELOPE ANDREWS, THE POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS: 
PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH AFRICA’S BASIC LAW 169–71 (2001) (describing the 
private, bilateral negotiating process). 
30. NAT’L PARTY, PRELIMINARY SUBMISSION ITEM 14: SOCIO ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS (N.D.) (on file with S. Afr. National Archives, CA 2/4/4/1/7/13) (“With 
regard to the rules for religious observances referred to in section 14(2), we wish to 
emphasise that the ‘appropriate authority’ that may issue them should be the 
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character of some schools, which could be done if the majority of 
learners and members of the school governing bodies were Christian 
or even a specific denomination of Christianity. On their insistence, 
the phrasing of the religion clause was altered to read “the 
appropriate public authorities.”  
The third section to the right to freedom of religion in the 1996 
Constitution was included after direct lobbying by ulamā groups 
during the constitutional negotiation process. It is this provision that 
provides the enabling legislation for the MMB under discussion: 
15(3)  (a) This section does not prevent legislation 
recognising –  
(i) marriages concluded under any 
tradition, or a system of religious, 
personal or family law; or 
(ii) systems of personal or family law 
under any tradition, or adhered to by 
persons professing a particular religion. 
(b) Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must 
be consistent with this section and the other 
provisions of the Constitution.31  
Sections 15, 31 and 9(3) emerged from the political process as 
the trilogy of constitutional provisions that, among others, gave a new 
place to religion in South Africa. In other words, constitutionally, 
they gave religion its place through the individual right to religion, 
equal recognition of religions, and non-discrimination on the grounds 
of religion. At the same time, like section 31, section 15(3), which 
affords parliament discretion to pass legislation to recognize among 
others religious marriages, also creates the possibility of 
subordinating religious practices to equality. As a result, 
discriminatory religious practices that are included within the 
legislation may not withstand constitutional scrutiny. In South Africa, 
we have not yet had occasion to test this theory since legislation 
aimed at recognizing religious marriages has not yet been enacted. 
However, we do have draft legislation proposing to recognize 
Muslim marriages in accordance with section 15(3). In the next two 
                                                                                                                                          
governing body of the institution in question and that, if need be, this should be 
stipulated in the constitution.”) 
31. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 15(3). 
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sections, we discuss that legislation in more detail and provide the 
background that led to its formulation. 
III. THE SOUTH AFRICAN MUSLIM COMMUNITY AND THE HISTORY 
OF   THE INTRODUCTION OF THE MUSLIM MARRIAGES BILL 
A large part of the South African Muslim community is not 
indigenous to Africa. Their ancestors were brought to South Africa 
from the seventeenth century as slaves, indentured labourers, political 
prisoners, convicts, and traders from various parts of the world 
including South Asia, South-East Asia, and Africa.32 The large 
majority of South African Muslims follow the Sunni tradition with a 
small number adhering to the Shi’i tradition.33 As a result of their 
origins, most Muslims in South Africa were classified by the 
apartheid state as Coloured and Indian, and many are still located 
within those historically racially disadvantaged communities.34 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a rising number of black 
Africans converting to Islam in South Africa and an increasing 
number of Muslims are also located in immigrant communities 
entering South Africa from other parts of Africa. To a much lesser 
extent, converts to Islam can further be found in the white South 
African community.  
Under British colonialism, Muslims could only practise Islam 
and regulate their religious personal laws within the private sphere 
because any public display of their religion was proscribed and 
punishable by death, though this was not actively enforced.35 It is not 
surprising, given how long Muslims have been in South Africa, that 
there are those within the community who organized themselves into 
ulamā bodies and assumed the authority to pronounce on everything 
related to Islam. Ulamā bodies have appropriated a quasi-judicial 
function that enables them to preside over disputes emanating from 
the Muslim community including those involving marriage and 
divorce. The biggest ulamā body in South Africa is the Sunni-based 
United Ulamā Council of South Africa (UUCSA), which was formed 
in 1994 and represents about 400 mosques, 200 Muslim educational 
                                                            
32. Ebrahim Moosa, The Dilemma of Islamic Rights Schemes, 15 J.  L. & 
RELIGION 185, 211 (2001). 
33. Moosa, supra note 19, at 131. 
34. Waheeda Amien, Reflections on the Recognition of African Customary 
Marriages in South Africa: Seeking Insights for the Recognition of Muslim 
Marriages, 13 ACTA JURIDICA COMP. & INT’L L. J. S. AFR. 357, 359 (2013). 
35. G.J. van Niekerk, Legal Pluralism, in INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
PLURALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 8–9 (J.C. Bekker et al., eds., Durban 2006). 
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institutions, and 1350 Muslim theologians across the country.36 It is 
an umbrella body that comprises seven affiliates: the Jamiatul Ulamā 
South Africa (established in 1923); the Muslim Judicial Council of 
South Africa (MJC) (established in 1945); the Jamiatul Ulamā of 
KwaZulu-Natal (established in 1955); the Sunni Jamiatul Ulamā of 
South Africa (established in 1978); the Sunni Ulamā Council of 
South Africa (established in 1992); the Eastern Cape Islamic 
Congress (established in 1996); and the Council of Ulamā Eastern 
Cape (established in 1999).37  
While South African Muslims were eventually permitted to 
practice their faith in the public domain, their religious personal laws 
were never afforded legal recognition, mainly because the potentially 
polygynous nature of their marriages did not conform to a Christian 
understanding of marriage. The racial discrimination they suffered 
was therefore integrally linked to religious discrimination. The call 
by Muslims for Muslim Personal Law (MPL) to be recognized thus 
emanates from a desire to have their dignity restored. However, other 
motivating factors also drive different sections of the Muslim 
community to advocate for the recognition of their personal laws. For 
instance, many members of the ulamā wish to regulate MPL in a 
legally enforceable manner and with the sanction of the state. While 
their decisions carry moral weight within the Muslim community, 
they are currently unenforceable. Gender activists also call for the 
recognition of Muslim marriages but to provide protection to Muslim 
women who are disparately affected by the non-recognition of their 
marriages.38 
In October 1993, just as the interim 1993 Constitution was being 
finalized, Muslim groups made a series of submissions to the 
Technical Committee responsible for drafting the Bill of Rights.39 
This opened up the issue of MPL and its recognition in the new 
Constitution. The Committee’s report noted that “[a]t a late stage of 
                                                            
36. About Us, UNITED ULAMA COUNCIL S. AFR., http://www.uucsa.net/index. 
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=3 (last visited May 8, 
2014). 
37. Id. 
38. Waheeda Amien, A South African Case Study for the Recognition and 
Regulation of Muslim Family Law in a Minority Muslim Secular Context, 24 INT’L 
J.  L. POL’Y & FAM. 361, 363 (2010). 
39. TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DURING TRANSITION, 
TWELFTH PROGRESS REPORT (Nov. 15, 1993), available at http://www.constitution 
net.org/files/3212.PDF. 
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the negotiation process representatives of the Muslim community 
made submissions . . . to the effect that the religious laws observed by 
certain communities . . . should also be recognized constitutionally in 
explicit terms.”40 Weeks of intense consultation followed. There were 
two broad perspectives presented from the Muslim community. On 
the one hand, the ulamā who initiated these representations argued 
for the recognition of Islamic law and particularly its family law 
elements. They also wanted the establishment of state funded or 
administered religious courts to apply this law. They made several 
arguments for this: recognition would provide redress for the second 
class status of Islam in South Africa; it would sanction the marriages, 
divorces, laws of succession and custody arrangements practiced by 
most Muslims; and it would legitimize the work of the ulamā by 
recognizing them and giving them access to non-voluntary modes of 
redress for the contravention of their rulings through fines or 
imprisonment. In the view of these members of the ulamā, Islamic 
law is divinely sanctioned and should remain immune to the 
intervention of secular or civil law. According to Moosa, they 
“postured themselves as the sole authorities on MPL to the exclusion 
of other sectors of the Muslim community.”41  
A second perspective came from a broad alliance of progressive 
Muslims who gathered in response to this proposal. This group 
included some ulamā authorities, particularly from the MJC, as well 
as Muslim community organizers, academics and women’s 
representatives. According to one member of the drafting committee, 
a submission by Ebrahim Moosa which was endorsed by a number of 
Muslim groups42 tipped the balance in the decisions of the 
Negotiating Council. Moosa’s submission clearly summarizes the 
issues of this more progressive perspective.  
Moosa’s submission acknowledged the widespread de facto 
practice of MPL in South Africa, which was (and still is) informally 
administered by various Muslim jurists. Moosa wrote that “[i]t is 
known that most Muslims would prefer to follow the dictates of their 
religion in matters of personal law, rather than secular law.”43 Given 
                                                            
40. Id.   
41. Moosa, supra note 1, at 128.  
42. Urgent Memorandum on Muslim Personal Law to Technical Committee 
(Nov. 2, 1993) (on file with the Univ. Cape Town Hugh Corder Collection). The 
memorandum was sent on Department of Religious Studies, University of Cape 
Town letterhead. The memorandum was endorsed by the Judicial Committee of the 
Islamic Council of South Africa, the Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa, 
Majlis as-Shura al-Islami, Call of Islam and the Central Islamic Trust.  
43. Id. 
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the fact that MPL did in fact guide many Muslims’ family relations, 
its non-recognition was problematic. Moosa’s main concern was that 
MPL as administered outside the ambit of the secular court system 
disadvantaged women.44 Practices he identified as problematic on the 
grounds of gender inequality include divorce by repudiation (talāq) 
and limited maintenance provisions.45  
Unlike the ulamā submissions, progressive Muslims highlighted 
the diversity of schools of Islamic interpretation and Muslim cultural 
practices in South Africa. For this reason, it was impossible they said, 
to simply recognize any one self-appointed authority on Islamic law. 
This was a matter that required wide debate across the Muslim 
community, and that debate should always include women.46 Moosa 
suggested that the outcome of those discussions should be the 
codification of MPL.47 Such codification, which was “imperative,” 
would provide the Muslim community with a chance to reform their 
practices and bring them into line with human rights norms, 
particularly around gender. Progressive Muslims argued that a similar 
codification in Tunisia had been conducted in ways that entrench 
gender equality that is true to Islam: “It is accepted that a human 
rights dispensation is in full accord with Islamic law.”48  
Some of the conservative ulamā’s demands are absent from 
section 15(3) of the 1996 Constitution. The submission about courts 
was deemed too specific for a transitional constitution and beyond the 
technical committee’s remit.49 The ANC also made it clear that the 
recognition of personal and family laws should only take place 
“within the framework of the Chapter on Fundamental Rights.”50 It 
would, in other words, only recognize such law where it guaranteed 
gender and other grounds for equality.  
                                                            
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. This is itself a contentious proposition according to more conservative 
interpretations of Islamic law in which the testimony of women is treated as less 
reliable than that of men.  
47. Urgent Memorandum on Muslim Personal Law to Technical Committee, 
supra note 42. 
48. Id.  
49. They suggested that if this issue of religious courts was to be taken up at 
all, it should be dealt with in the chapter on Traditional Authorities that was at the 
time debating customary courts. This did not happen.  
50. Urgent Memorandum on Muslim Personal Law to Technical Committee, 
supra note 42. 
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Section 15(3)(a) is the same as its concomitant provision in 
section 14(3) of the 1993 Constitution with one exception. While the 
latter did not prevent the legislation of marriages and systems of 
personal and family law, the 1996 Constitution replaced the and with 
or. The reason for this can be found in debates internal to the Muslim 
community about who has the right to represent and interpret Islamic 
legal thought. Subsequent to the enactment of the 1993 Constitution, 
a Muslim Personal Law Board (MPLB) was established to draft 
legislation to recognize MPL.51 Due to ideological differences 
between the more progressive and conservative voices on the MPLB, 
it disbanded within a year. Conservative members of the ulamā 
represented on the MPLB believed that as a divinely sanctioned 
system, MPL could not be subordinated to the Constitution. In 
contrast, progressive members adopted the view that progressive 
interpretations of MPL allowed it to be consistent with constitutional 
provisions, including gender equality. Thus, a progressive approach 
to MPL enabled the latter to be compatible with the Constitution so 
there would be no need for subordination by one to the other.52 For 
some years, this situation led to a deadlock, and no further action was 
taken to make use of the Constitution’s enabling provision.  
The process to recognize MPL was revived in 1999 when the 
South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) appointed a 
Project Committee to draft legislation in accordance with section 
15(3)(a).53 This time their brief was to propose recognition to Muslim 
marriages as opposed to a system of personal or family laws. 
Members of the Project Committee were nominated through a public 
process and comprised a majority of Muslims from among the 
judiciary, legal profession, academia, and representatives of UUCSA. 
After a period of four years of extensive consultation with the South 
African Muslim community, the Project Committee submitted a 
comprehensive report accompanied by a draft Muslim Marriages Bill 
to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Development in 2003 
                                                            
51. Abdulkader Tayob, The Struggle over Muslim Personal Law in a Rights-
Based Constitution: A South African Case Study 22 RECHT VAN DE ISLAM 1, 3 
(2005) (“In 1994, the government appointed a Muslim Personal Law Board to 
propose a system of Islamic law . . . . The body consisted of members from both the 
religious leadership and representatives from the youth organizations that were 
active against apartheid. The Board collapsed by April 1995 when its members 
could not reach agreement.”). 
52. Id. at 3–6. 
53. Waheeda Amien, The Muslim Marriages Bill: Is It the Answer to the 
Dilemma of Non-Recognition of Muslim Marriages in South Africa? (2009), 
http://www.engender.org.za/publications/WAmienMuslimViewsArticleMMB.pdf. 
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(hereafter referred to as the 2003 MMB).54 Tayob suggests that the 
process undertaken by the SALRC Project Committee proved to be 
more successful than the efforts of the MPLB because of the 
narrower focus on the recognition of marriages rather than the 
broader object of codifying a whole system of personal or family 
laws. This enabled the Project Committee to concentrate on the direct 
needs of the Muslim community relating to marriage and divorce and 
address those in draft legislation instead of getting bogged down by 
the ideological differences that had plagued the MPLB.55 The 
remarkable thing is that even though there was significant consensus 
on the 2003 MMB, it languished in the Ministry amidst the perhaps 
more urgent task of rewriting almost every piece of legislation in the 
newly democratic state. Still, it is unclear why the Ministry did not 
push for its enactment. Did it lack the political will to do so? Did it 
expect 100% support from the Muslim community, given the 
dissident voices of very conservative members of the ulamā who 
rejected any type of state regulation of MPL as well as those 
members of the Shi’i community who felt that their needs were not 
catered for in a largely Sunni-favourable MMB? Was the Ministry 
persuaded by gender activists within secular society that the MMB 
should not be enacted unless it was 100% consistent with gender 
equality?  
Whatever the reason, no further progress was made for seven 
years until a women’s rights NGO, the Women’s Legal Centre 
(WLC), instituted an action in 2009, asking the Constitutional Court 
to order the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development to 
enact legislation to recognize Muslim marriages.56 Although the 
Court decided against the WLC because they had instituted the action 
in the incorrect court, it did spur the Department to apply its mind to 
the MMB. During 2010, without any further consultation, the 
Department submitted an amended version of the MMB to Cabinet, 
which subsequently approved it (hereafter referred to as the 2010 
MMB).57 This meant that the MMB could formally enter the 
                                                            
54. See generally SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION ISLAMIC 
MARRIAGES & RELATED MATTERS REP. (2003) [hereinafter SALRC REP.] 
available at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj59_2003jul.pdf. 
55. Tayob, supra note 51, at 6. 
56. Women’s Legal Trust v. President of the Republic of South Africa, and 
Others 2009 (6) SA 94 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
57. Muslim Marriages Bill, 2010, available at http://www.justice.gov.za/legisl 
ation/bills/2010_muslim-marriages-bill.pdf [hereinafter 2010 MMB] (S.Afr.). 
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parliamentary process for consideration by the Portfolio Committee 
on Justice and Constitutional Development and the National 
Assembly. However, four years later, this has still not happened.  
The majority of the Muslim community, including members of 
the ulamā and many gender activists, appeared to support the 2003 
MMB even though it did not contain all their demands.58 The 
majority of the ulamā were satisfied that the 2003 MMB was Sharī’a 
compliant and gender activists who pushed for its enactment believed 
that it would provide more protection for Muslim women than they 
have in the absence of legislation. In contrast, those members of the 
ulamā who supported the 2003 MMB withdrew their support for the 
2010 version on the basis that amendments that were unilaterally 
effected by the Department had rendered the MMB non-compliant 
with Sharī’a. This has now brought the process to a halt and has 
effectively reversed four years of work by the SALRC. However, 
given the Ministry’s unenthusiastic treatment of the 2003 MMB, one 
wonders if a retreat to the drawing board in relation to the 2010 
MMB by all the relevant parties concerned would actually make a 
difference. There is more work to be done to understand the 
dynamics within the Department that have prevented the process 
from reaching any kind of conclusion. 
Having given some background to the creation of the MMB in 
its two forms (2003 and 2010), we now turn to its contents and 
examine how the drafters and Muslim activists sought to develop a 
compromise position amidst the demands of the Constitution, various 
forms of legal interpretation of MPL, and secular or civil forms of 
marriage. This includes a more detailed description of the 
controversial provisions in the 2010 MMB that seem to have halted 
any possibility of its enactment. A synopsis of the gender-
problematic provisions is also included. 
IV.   THE MUSLIM MARRIAGES BILL 
The 2010 Muslim Marriages Bill (MMB) recommends that legal 
recognition be afforded to Muslim marriages and proposes a 
comprehensive framework that encompasses a mainly Sunni 
paradigm for the regulation of Muslim family law. According to the 
Preamble, the aim of the MMB is: 
                                                            
58. Waheeda Amien, Why Forsake Muslim Women? 42 THINKER 26, 27 (2012) 
(“Although the [Muslim Marriages Bill 2003] did not meet all the demands of all 
the role players, it was certainly a document that most felt that they could live 
with.”). 
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To make provision for the recognition of Muslim 
marriages; to specify the requirements for a valid 
Muslim marriage; to regulate the registration of 
Muslim marriages; to recognize the status and 
capacity of spouses in Muslim marriages; to regulate 
the proprietary consequences of Muslim marriages; to 
regulate the termination of Muslim marriages and the 
consequences thereof; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith.59  
To a large extent, the MMB purports to recognize the majority of 
characteristics associated with a traditional understanding of Sunni 
marriages. For instance, in clause 1, it defines a Muslim marriage as 
one that is “between a man and a woman contracted in accordance 
with Islamic law only.”60 
The MMB then defines Islamic law as “the law as derived from 
the Holy Qur’an, the Sunnah (Prophetic model), the consensus of 
Muslim Jurists (Isma) and analogical deductions based on the 
primary sources (Qiyas).”61 
The MMB further provides the following definition of a 
“Muslim” as “a person who believes in the oneness of Allah and who 
believes in the Holy Messenger Muhammad as the final prophet and 
who has faith in all the essentials of Islam.”62 Here we should note 
that the definition of a Muslim is one that depends on individual 
belief and faith rather than membership of a community or culture. 
Through these definitions, the MMB excludes same-sex couples from 
concluding a Muslim marriage that could be registered under the 
MMB, even though South Africa legislates and recognizes same-sex 
unions.63 It could also exclude those following the Shi’i tradition, and 
the conclusion of a Shi’i-type mutah (temporary) marriage, which 
would arguably not be recognized under the MMB. The drafters also 
make the very questionable assumption that all Muslims agree on the 
essentials of Islam.  
The MMB further limits the sources of Islamic law to primary 
and secondary sources. The exclusion of subsidiary sources is 
                                                            
59. 2010 MMB, supra note 57, at pmbl.  
60. Id. at cl. 1. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. See Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.) (noting that Civil Unions between 
same-sex couples will be recognized under the law). 
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problematic because that is where the greatest potential for the reform 
of Islamic law lies. For example, maslahā (public interest), istihsān 
(the discretion to relax a rule that could result in harm), ‘urf and ‘adat 
(customs and practices followed within a community) are but a few 
of the subsidiary sources of Islamic law. These sources enable greater 
responsiveness to the lived social and economic realities of any 
Muslim community. Without recognition of the subsidiary sources of 
Islamic law, its interpretation and application will most likely 
entrench existing conservative and male-centered understandings and 
practices. The 2003 MMB did not contain a definition of Islamic law. 
It is unclear why the Department would see fit to include a definition 
in the 2010 MMB, particularly one as limiting as this. Had the 
Department consulted about the proposed definition, it might have 
realized the disastrous implications that a reductionist definition of 
Islamic law could have for marginalized members of the Muslim 
community. 
Other features of a traditional Sunni understanding of Muslim 
family law are incorporated into the 2010 MMB. These include the 
consent of both parties (this is an especially Hanafī interpretation); 
marriage by proxy should either party prefer that option; prompt and 
deferred mahr (the dower payable by the husband to the wife); 
nafaqah (a husband’s unilateral obligation to maintain his wife, 
wives, and children, which includes separate residence for the wife in 
the case of dissolution of the marriage while the children are in her 
custody); polygyny (a husband being permitted to have multiple 
wives); a wife’s right to be compensated for breastfeeding; a wife’s 
right to be compensated for services rendered in her husband’s or his 
family’s business; separate matrimonial property estates for the 
spouses; the right of both spouses to be compensated for direct 
contributions to the maintenance or growth of each other’s estates; 
alternative dispute resolution preceding dissolution of the marriage; 
iddah (the waiting period observed by the wife following dissolution 
of the marriage by death or divorce); mut’ah al-talāq (compensation 
owed to the wife when the marriage is dissolved at the unjustified 
behest of the husband); and most of the different forms of dissolution 
of a Muslim marriage that are available to men and women including 
talāq (a husband’s unilateral right to repudiate his wife), tafwīd-al-
talāq (where a husband delegates his right of talāq to his wife), 
khul’a (the dissolution of the marriage at the instance of the wife) and 
faskh (a fault-based divorce available to men and women).64 The 
grounds for faskh, which are listed in the 2010 MMB, are in fact 
                                                            
64. 2010 MMB, supra note 57, §§ 1, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12. 
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similar to so-called secular or civil grounds for divorce found in 
many western jurisdictions: 
“Faskh” means a decree of dissolution of a marriage 
granted by a court, upon the application of a husband 
or wife, on any ground or basis permitted by Islamic 
law, including, in the case of a wife, any one or more 
of the following grounds, namely where -  
(a) the husband is missing, or his whereabouts are 
not known, for a substantial period of time (Mafqūd 
al-Khabar);  
(b) the husband fails to maintain his wife (Adam 
al-Infāq);  
(c) the husband has been sentenced to 
imprisonment for a period of three years or more, 
provided that the wife is entitled to apply for a decree 
of the dissolution of the marriage within a period of 
one year as from the date of sentencing;  
(d) the husband is mentally ill, or in a state of 
continued unconsciousness as provided for in section 
5 of the Divorce Act, which provisions apply with the 
changes required by the context (Junūn);  
(e) the husband suffers from impotence or a 
serious disease which renders cohabitation intolerable 
(Ayb);  
(f) the husband treats his wife with cruelty in any 
form, which renders cohabitation intolerable (Dharar);  
(g) the husband has failed, without valid reason, 
to perform his marital obligations for an unreasonable 
period (Dharar);  
(h) the husband is a spouse in more than one 
Muslim marriage and fails to treat his wife justly in 
accordance with the injunctions of the Qur’an and 
Sunnah (Dharar);  
(i) the husband commits harm against his wife, as 
recognized by Islamic law (Dharar); or  
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(j) discord between the spouses has undermined 
the objects of marriage, including the foundational 
values of mutual love, affection, companionship and 
understanding, with the result that the dissolution of 
the marriage is an option in the circumstances 
(Shiqāq).65 
Members of the majority Sunni ulamā do not appear to have a 
problem with the above formulations of the 2010 MMB. However, 
amendments by the Department to the issue of who would have the 
authority to interpret and apply the MMB and the nature of the 
mediation process preceding adjudication has caused most of the 
ulamā to now treat the 2010 MMB as un-Islamic.  
Unlike the 2003 MMB, which proposed that a secular court 
comprising a Muslim judge and two Islamic law experts as assessors 
should adjudicate opposed matters arising from the MMB, the 2010 
MMB does not make any reference to Muslim judges or Islamic law 
experts as assessors. As the Indian case of Shah Bano66 teaches us, 
many Muslims take the issue of who is authorized to interpret and 
adjudicate Islamic law very seriously indeed. This is why the 
compromise that the ulamā reached with the SALRC Project 
Committee, which required a Muslim judge and Islamic law experts 
as assessors to preside over opposed matters, was palatable to the 
ulamā. Clauses 15(1) and 16(1) of the 2003 MMB titled “Courts and 
assessors” provided: 
15(1) If any dispute is referred to a court for 
adjudication, the following provisions  
 shall apply –  
(a) the Judge President or other head of the court 
which has jurisdiction, shall appoint a Muslim judge 
from that court to hear such dispute, and if there is no 
Muslim judge, the Minister for Justice and 
Constitutional Development shall appoint a duly 
admitted practicing Muslim advocate or attorney of at 
least 10 years’ standing as acting presiding officer: 
Provided that in urgent matters and in cases of an 
application under Rule 43 of the High Court Rules, the 
matter may be determined by a non-Muslim judge 
sitting without assessors;  
                                                            
65. Id. § 1. 
66. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 844 (India). 
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(b) the court shall be assisted by two Muslim assessors 
who shall have specialised knowledge of Islamic law. 
. . . 
16 (1) In the event of proceedings being instituted 
under this Act for the confirmation or grant of a decree 
of dissolution of a Muslim marriage or other relief, 
and such proceedings are not opposed, or in the event 
of the parties having concluded a settlement 
agreement, the matter shall be heard by a Muslim 
judge sitting without assessors.67  
These provisions are creative examples of how religious 
plurality could be accommodated within a secular legal framework. 
However, the Department removed them from the 2010 MMB 
without consulting with the relevant stake-holders. Practical 
considerations such as whether or not there are a sufficient number of 
Muslim judges within the judiciary and how one would determine 
who qualifies as a Muslim judge should not be minimized or 
dismissed. Yet, if these issues were cause for concern for the 
Department, they should have been revisited with the ulamā and 
gender activists who had initially supported the 2003 MMB. 
The second issue that has caused the ulamā considerable 
trepidation is the conversion of a compulsory mediation process 
recommended in the 2003 MMB, to a voluntary mediation process 
advocated in the 2010 MMB. The ulamā argue that Islamic law 
requires a process preceding the dissolution of a marriage that 
involves an attempt at reconciliation through the assistance of two 
“arbiters.”68 The authority for this assertion is derived from Qur’ān 4: 
35: 
If ye fear a breach between them twain, appoint (two) 
arbiters, one from his family, and the other from hers; 
if they wish for peace, God will cause their 
                                                            
67. SALRC REP., supra note 54, at 127. 
68. See id. at 91 (noting that the United Ulama Council, and others, proposed 
that the SALRC consider “mandatory mediation and voluntary arbitration, before a 
dispute is referred to court, as an integral part of the Bill.”) This proposal was 
opposed by the Commission on Gender Equality and the Muslim Youth Movement. 
Id. 
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reconciliation: for God hath full knowledge, and is 
acquainted with all things.69 
The change in the form of the mediation process is a serious 
breach of the agreement between the ulamā and the SALRC Project 
Committee, most likely as a trade off for not establishing a separate 
Sharī’a court. The mediation process is probably the forum in which 
the ulamā envisaged exercising control over the outcome of disputes. 
In both the 2003 and 2010 MMB’s, unless the mediation agreement 
between the parties relates to minor children, provision is made that 
the court cannot overrule the mediation agreement.70 In fact, the 
proposed change in the status of the mediation proceedings has now 
given some members of the ulamā the gap to advocate for the 
establishment of a parallel Sharī’a Arbitration Forum or Sharī’a 
Court over which they would have exclusive power and from which 
they could render enforceable orders. Should the Traditional Courts 
Bill (TCB)71 be enacted, they would have a strong case to set up a 
parallel adjudication system that has the force of law. However, 
gender activists have thus far succeeded in preventing the TCB from 
being enacted. 
A third contentious issue for the ulamā relates to the question of 
choice for those Muslims who do not wish to be bound by the 
provisions of the legislation. The 2010 MMB recommends that those 
who enter into a Muslim marriage after the MMB is enacted must 
register their marriage in accordance with the provisions of the MMB 
in order for it to regulate their marriage. In contrast, the MMB will 
automatically apply to those who enter into a Muslim marriage before 
the enactment of the MMB and they will have a prescribed period of 
time in which to opt-out of the provisions of the MMB. For those 
who choose not to have their marriages regulated by the MMB, the 
current legal status of non-recognition that applies to Muslim 
marriages will apply to Muslim marriages that are not registered after 
the MMB comes into operation: 
2 (1) The provisions of this Act apply to Muslim 
marriages concluded after the commencement of this 
Act where the parties to the marriage elect, in the 
prescribed manner, to be bound by the provisions of 
this Act.  
                                                            
69. THE HOLY QUR’AN 4:35 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., 1946) [hereinafter 
QUR’AN]. 
70. SALRC REP., supra note 54, at 125–26; 2010 MMB, supra note 57, § 12. 
71. Traditional Courts Bill, 2012, Bill 1-2012 available at http://www.justice. 
gov.za/legislation/bills/2012-b01tradcourts.pdf (S. Afr.).  
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(2) The provisions of this Act apply to Muslim 
marriages concluded before the commencement of this 
Act, unless the parties, within a period of 36 months or 
such longer period as may be prescribed, as from the 
date of the commencement of this Act, jointly elect, in 
the prescribed manner, not to be bound by the 
provisions of this Act, in which event the provisions of 
this Act do not apply to such a marriage.  
(3) The law applying to a Muslim marriage in respect 
of which the parties have elected not to be bound by 
the provisions of this Act, is the law as it was before 
this Act came into operation. 72   
This is a difficult issue pertaining to the balancing of secular and 
religious laws in liberal systems. Individual choice is a fundamental 
liberal value. The ulamā would prefer that the opt-in option, which 
the MMB proposes for those entering into Muslim marriages after its 
enactment, should also be made available to those who are parties to 
Muslim marriages prior to the enactment of the MMB. In other 
words, the ulamā suggest a reversal of onus where the burden of 
opting-out is not placed on Muslim parties. Rather, they should have 
the burden of opting-in. If the ulamā’s suggestion is incorporated into 
the final legislation, it could potentially prejudice women in existing 
Muslim marriages whose husbands are opposed to being bound by 
the provisions of the MMB. So the interplay between opt-in and opt-
out becomes a manifestation of the tension between an otherwise 
marginalized individual’s right to enjoy the benefits of the proposed 
legislation and an individual’s right to exercise her or his right to 
religious freedom.  
The 2010 MMB also contains several provisions that are 
problematic for women’s rights. Besides the limiting definitions of a 
Muslim marriage and Islamic law, the MMB includes a conservative 
interpretation of khul’a, which prevents women from enjoying an 
equal right to divorce: 
Khula’ means the dissolution of the marriage bond at 
the instance of the wife, in terms of an agreement for 
the transfer of property or other permissible 
                                                            
72. 2010 MMB, supra note 57, § 2. 
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consideration between the spouses according to 
Islamic law. 73 
This definition effectively requires the husband to consent to the 
amount that a wife must pay to him to be released from the marriage. 
Traditionally, khul’a requires the wife to give back her mahr if it has 
been paid to her or waive receiving it if the husband has not yet 
paid.74  A progressive interpretation of khul’a incorporated into the 
laws of Egypt75 for example, does not require the husband’s consent 
regarding the amount that a wife needs to give him to leave the 
marriage. This progressive interpretation effectively balances the 
husband’s unilateral right to talāq, which requires him to pay any 
outstanding mahr when he exercises the talāq. The conservative 
interpretation of khul’a reflected in the MMB effectively enables a 
husband to prevent his wife from successfully exercising the khul’a. 
In addition, neither the 2003 nor 2010 MMB’s make provision for 
mubara’a, which is a mutual form of divorce where the husband and 
wife agree to no longer be married to each other. 
Women’s rights activists have also taken issue with the provision 
incorporating the traditional Islamic law rule that spouses must 
maintain separate estates when entering marriage, during the 
marriage and upon dissolution of the marriage. The 2010 MMB 
reads: 
8 (1) A Muslim marriage to which this Act applies is 
deemed to be a marriage out of community of property 
excluding the accrual system, unless the proprietary 
consequences governing the marriage are regulated by 
                                                            
73. Id. § 1. 
74. Nik Noriani Nik Badli Shah, Legislative Provisions & Judicial 
Mechanisms for the Enforcement and Termination of the Islamic Marriage 
Contract in Malaysia, in THE ISLAMIC MARRIAGE CONTRACT: CASE STUDIES IN 
ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 190–191 (Asifa Quraishi & Frank E. Vogel eds., 2008) (“In 
classical Islamic law [Khul’a] was a divorce by which the wife obtains her 
husband’s consent . . . by some sort of compensation (e.g., return of the dower 
[mahr])”; Mona Zulficar, The Islamic Marriage Contract in Egypt, in THE ISLAMIC 
MARRIAGE CONTRACT: CASE STUDIES IN ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 234 (Asifa 
Quraishi & Frank E, Vogel eds., 2008) (“[in Ottoman Egypt] [i]f the wife . . . 
wanted a divorce without having to prove fault . . . she had the option of khul’, 
divorce agreed by mutual consent . . . [i]n the case of disagreement, she could 
automatically obtain a divorce through Khul’ by a court judgment, but usually at 
the price of her financial rights to deferred dower.”) The exact nature of Khul’a was 
the subject of several submissions to the SALRC. SALRC REP., supra note 54, at 
23–24. 
75. Law No. 1 of 2000 (Law on the Reorganization of Certain Terms and 
Procedures of Litigation in Personal Status Matters) art. 20 (Egypt). 
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mutual agreement of the spouses, in an ante nuptial 
contract which must be registered in the Deeds 
Registry.76 
While this traditional rule was introduced in seventh century 
Arabia to protect the property of wives, the socio-economic reality of 
the twenty-first century is that many Muslim women are left without 
financial protection when their marriages end because the bulk of the 
marital assets are registered in their husbands’ names. Since a 
Muslim marriage is treated as a contract under Islamic law, it would 
not be Islamically impermissible to create a default community of 
property regime or an out of community of property regime subject to 
an accrual system, while affording those Muslims who wish to have 
an out of community property regime excluding the accrual system 
the opportunity to do so through an antenuptial contract.77 
The 2010 MMB further recognizes the single most defining 
feature of a Muslim marriage: its potentially polygynous nature. In 
clause 8(4)-(7), the MMB enables a husband to take multiple wives. 
It seeks to set out the conditions for entering into second and 
subsequent marriages: 
(4) In the case of a husband who is a spouse in more 
than one Muslim marriage, all persons having a 
sufficient interest in the matter, and in particular the 
husband’s existing spouses, must be joined in the 
proceedings.  
. . . 
(6) A husband in a Muslim marriage, to which this Act 
applies, who wishes to conclude a further Muslim 
                                                            
76. 2010 MMB, supra note 57, § 8(1). 
77. Clause 8(1) of the MMB is consistent with an “out of community of 
property regime that excludes the accrual system.” Id. The default matrimonial 
property regime under South African law entails one of community of property, 
which enables spouses to share equally in a joint estate. The joint estate comprises 
their assets that they bring into the marriage and acquire during the subsistence of 
the marriage. Spouses can opt out of the default community of property regime by 
registering an antenuptial contract that records a choice to enter into an out of 
community of property regime that either includes or excludes the accrual system. 
The accrual system enables spouses to enter the marriage with separate estates, to 
maintain separate estates during the marriage, but to share in the accrual of their 
estates when the marriage ends in divorce or death. Cf.  Matrimonial Property Act 
88 of 1984.  
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marriage with another woman after the 
commencement of this Act must apply to court –  
(a) for approval to conclude a further Muslim marriage 
in terms of subsection (7); and  
(b) for approval of a written contract which will 
regulate the future matrimonial property system of his 
marriages.  
(7)(a) When considering the application in terms of 
subsection (6), the court must grant approval if it is 
satisfied that the husband is able to maintain equality 
between his spouses as is prescribed by the Holy 
Qur’an. 78   
A strict application of the above provisions will permit a 
husband to take a maximum of four wives, which accords with the 
mainstream understanding of Islamic law.79  
To the best of our knowledge, there is no statistical data on the 
extent of polygyny among Muslims in South Africa, itself a 
consequence of those marriages taking place outside the framework 
of state law and registration. There is, however, some research that 
reveals that many South African Muslim women are not in favour of 
polygyny.80 This study is based on a sample of married Muslim 
women living in Cape Town. Approximately 4% of the participants 
of that study had husbands who had taken second wives.81  Three 
quarters of the women participants said they would be unhappy or 
very unhappy if their husbands were to enter into second or 
subsequent marriages.82  In addition, 71% said that they would 
                                                            
78. 2010 MMB, supra note 57, § 8(4–7). 
79. See QUR’AN, supra note 69, at 4:3 (“Marry women of your choice, two, or 
three, or four.”). 
80. S. Shaikh et al., South African Muslim Women: Sexuality, Marriage and 
Reproductive Choices, Research Report, 31 J.  ISLAMIC STUD. 96 (2001). For more 
empirical data on Muslim marriages in difficulty, through divorce, polygyny, and 
spousal abuse, see Mogamat Yoesrie Toefy, Divorce in the Muslim Community of 
the Western Cape: a Demographic Study of 600 Divorce Records at the Muslim 
Judicial Council and National Ulama Council between 1994 and 1999 (2001) 
(unpublished M.A. Dissertation, University of Cape Town) (on file with author); 
SINDRE BANGSTAD, GLOBAL FLOWS, LOCAL APPROPRIATIONS: FACETS OF 
SECULARISATION AND RE-ISLAMIZATION AMONG CONTEMPORARY CAPE MUSLIMS 
(2007). 
81. Shaikh et al., supra note 80, at 15.  
82. Id. at 16.  
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separate from or divorce their husbands if they actually took a second 
wife.83 
Although the recommended recognition of polygyny could give 
rise to a constitutional challenge on the basis of gender and sex since 
the same right to enter into polygynous marriages is not afforded to 
women, the Constitutional Court has indicated that it will entertain a 
reasonable accommodation of religious practices84 The protective 
mechanisms recommended in the MMB to deal with polygyny may 
lead the Constitutional Court to conclude that the interests of Muslim 
women are sufficiently protected thus potentially amounting to a 
reasonable accommodation of the religious practice. For example, a 
husband would be required to apply to court for approval of the 
contract that will regulate his subsequent marriage; an existing wife 
would have to be joined in the proceedings, which would afford her 
the opportunity to provide a view on the proposed marriage; and the 
husband would have to show that he would be “able to maintain 
equality between his spouses.” 85 This is the approach that was taken 
in the legislation regulating polygynous African customary 
marriages.86 The only difference is that the MMB tailors the 
requirement of “equality between his spouses” to the Qur’ānic 
understanding of equality in an attempt to be accommodative of 
Islamic nuances pertaining to polygyny. Several English translations 
of Qur’ān 4:3, which is the verse that arguably permits polygyny in 
Islam, suggest that a husband is only permitted to take more than one 
wife if he can ensure that it will not result in injustice between his 
wives.87 The condition of equality within the context of polygyny as 
provided for in the MMB may therefore be interpreted within the 
parameters of the wives being treated justly. This may not necessarily 
equate to absolute equality between the wives if a measure of 
inequality between them still results in justice being served. 
Of the many Islamic law rights and practices that the 2010 MMB 
incorporates, not all are proactively encouraged by all the members 
of the South African ulamā even though they would not deny their 
                                                            
83. Id. at 109.  
84. Christian Education South Africa v. Minister of Education, 2000 (4) SA 
757 (CC) at para. 51 (S. Afr.).  
85. 2010 MMB, supra note 57, § 8(7). 
86. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (S. Afr.). 
87. See Verse (4:3) - English Translation, QURANIC ARABIC CORPUS, 
http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=4&verse=3 (last visited May 10, 
2014) (showing seven parallel translations of the Arabic text).  
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authenticity as Islamically recognized rights and obligations. Some of 
those rights that benefit women have already been mentioned. These 
include the wife’s right to be compensated for breastfeeding; her 
services rendered in her husband’s or his family’s business; the 
husband’s obligation to provide his ex-wife with accommodation 
while the children are in her custody; and a spouse’s right to be 
compensated for her or his direct contributions to the other’s estate.88  
At the same time, the 2010 MMB does not include all the Sunni 
rights that are available to women in marriage. For instance, a wife 
has an Islamic law right to be compensated for her labour in the 
home, which the MMB does not provide for.  
When it comes to issues relating to the guardianship, custody of, 
or access to, a minor child born of the Muslim marriage, an attempt is 
made to ensure consistency with the secular principle of the best 
interests of the child while maintaining deference to Islamic law: 
10 (1) In making an order for the custody of, or access 
to a minor child, or in making a decision on 
guardianship, the court must, with due regard to 
Islamic law and the report and recommendations of 
the Family Advocate, which must take into account 
Islamic norms and values, consider the welfare and 
best interests of the child. 89   
The concern is that a conservative interpretation of Islamic laws 
relating to guardianship, custody of, and access to, minor children 
could militate against women and infringe their right to gender 
equality. For instance, a traditional Sunni approach only recognizes a 
right of guardianship in favour of men if the child is born within 
wedlock. Furthermore, a mother only has limited rights of custody 
especially in relation to her son. The Sunni Māliki school allows a 
mother to have custody of her male child until he becomes pubescent 
and the Sunni Hanafī and Shāfi’ī schools only enable a mother to 
have custody of her male child until he is seven years old. 90  In the 
case of female children, the Hanafī school permits the mother to 
retain custody until her daughter reaches puberty while the Shāfi’ī 
and Māliki schools allow the mother to have custody until her 
                                                            
88. 2010 MMB, supra note 57, § 9(8)(b). 
89. Id. § 10(1). 
90. Sherman A. Jackson, Kramer versus Kramer in a Tenth/Sixth Century 
Egyptian Court: Post-Formative Jurisprudence between Exigency and Law, 8 
ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y. 27, 33–34 n.25 (2001). 
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daughter is married. However, if the mother marries another man, she 
loses all custodial rights over her children.91  
The synopsis of the MMB presented in the previous paragraphs 
illustrates that if either version of the MMB is enacted, it will result 
in the codification of a parallel religious-based family law system. On 
the one hand, this could enable Muslim women to access Islamic law 
rights through a secular framework. On the other hand, this could just 
as easily entrench gender-based discriminatory rules within the 
secular legal system.  
In the absence of legislation enabling both Muslim women and 
men to assert their Islamic law rights arising from their Muslim 
marriages, all is not lost. Since the introduction of South Africa’s 
democratic constitutional dispensation in 1994, the judiciary has 
provided some relief. In the next section, we consider how the post-
1994 judiciary has approached the issue of Muslim marriages.  
V.    JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
 The judiciary under the colonial and apartheid states refused to 
recognize potentially polygynous marriages on the basis that they 
were contra bonos mores or against their understanding of public 
policy.92 However, in the groundbreaking case of Ryland v. Edros,93 
which was decided in 1997, the Cape High Court (as it then was) for 
the first time in the history of South Africa rejected the colonial and 
apartheid interpretations of public policy in the context of marriage. 
The Court held that public policy prior to the introduction of a 
constitutional democracy in South Africa had been informed by the 
presumed views of only one section of South African society.94 The 
Court found that it was: 
“[I]nimical to all the values of the new South Africa 
for one group to impose its values on another and that 
                                                            
91. E.g., JOHN L. ESPOSITO & NATANA J. DELONG-BAS, WOMEN IN MUSLIM 
FAMILY LAW 35 (2001). 
92. Bronn v. Frits Bronn’s Executors and Others 1860 (3) SC 313 (CSC) (S. 
Afr.); Seedat’s Executors v. The Master (Natal) 1917 A.D. 302; Estate Mehta v. 
Acting Master, High Court 1958 (4) SA 252 (F.C.) (S. Afr.); Kader v. Kader Bronn 
v. Frits Bronn’s Executors and Others 1860 (3) SC 313 (CSC) (S. Afr.); Seedat’s 
Executors v. The Master (Natal) 1917 A.D. 302; Estate Mehta v. Acting Master, 
High Court 1958 (4) SA 252 (F.C.) (S. Afr.); Kader v. Kader 1972 (3) SA 203 (R., 
A.D.) (S. Afr.); Ismail v. Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) (R., AD) (S. Afr.). 
93. 1997 (2) SA 690 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
94. Id. at 707 G. 
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the Courts should only brand a [marriage] contract as 
offensive to public policy if it is offensive to those 
values which are shared by the community at large, by 
all right-thinking people in the community and not 
only by one section of it.”95  
The Court emphasized that “the values of equality and tolerance 
of diversity and the recognition of the plural nature of our society are 
among the values that underlie our Constitution.”96 Consequently, in 
paying tribute to the multicultural nature of South African society 
that is now defined by the constitutional values promoting equality 
between groups and an acceptance of diversity, the Court recognized 
a monogamous Muslim marriage as a contract that is enforceable 
under South African law. In particular, the Court granted the wife’s 
claim for spousal maintenance and mut’ah al-talāq.97 The Court did 
not grant the wife’s claim for an equitable share of her tangible 
and intangible contributions to the growth of her husband’s estate 
because no evidence had been presented to confirm that such a 
practice was prevalent within the Muslim community in which the 
parties had been members.98 
Following the example set by the Court in Ryland, a growing 
trend has emerged within the judiciary to afford recognition to proven 
terms and customs arising from the Muslim marriage contract. In 
fact, subsequent to Ryland, the judiciary has on a case-by-case basis 
enforced Islamic law obligations through secular or civil legislation. 
For instance, in 1999, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Amod 
v. Multilateral Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commissioner for Gender 
Equality Intervening)99 accepted the unilateral obligation of a 
husband to support his wife in a monogamous Muslim marriage as a 
duty that was worthy of recognition and respect under the law.100 As 
a result, the Islamic maintenance obligation of the husband in a 
monogamous Muslim marriage was given expression through the 
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act 93 of 1989, which 
enabled the Muslim wife of the deceased Muslim husband to benefit 
as his dependant.101  Thereafter, in 2005, in the case of Khan v. 
Khan,102 the Transvaal Provincial Division (as it then was) extended 
                                                            
95. Id. at 707 F. 
96. Id. at 708 I. 
97. Id. at 718 I. 
98. Id. at 717 H, 719 A. 
99. 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
100. Id. at 1329–30 para. 23.  
101. Id. at 1320–21. 
102. 2005 (2) SA 272 (T) at (281–283) (S. Afr.). 
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recognition of a Muslim wife’s right to spousal maintenance to 
instances of polygyny, and permitted the polygynous Muslim wife to 
enforce her maintenance claim against her husband through the 
Maintenance Act 99 of 1998.103 More recently, the right of a Muslim 
wife to access rule 43 of the Uniform Rules of Court was recognized, 
enabling her to claim interim maintenance and custody of and access 
to her minor child/ren born of the Muslim marriage pending 
finalization of her claim to have the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 apply to 
the dissolution of her Muslim marriage.104 In the cases dealing with 
the rule 43 application, the parties settled out of court so the judiciary 
did not have the opportunity to indicate whether or not it would have 
granted the wives’ claims to regulate the dissolution of their Muslim 
marriages through the secular or civil divorce legislation. 
The judiciary has also interpreted the word “spouse” in certain 
secular or civil legislation to include or extend to Muslim spouses so 
that the latter can enjoy the benefits of the legislation. For instance, in 
Daniels v. Campbell NO and Others105 and Fatima Gabie Hassam v. 
Johan Hermanus Jacobs NO and Others,106 the Constitutional Court 
permitted Muslim spouses respectively in monogamous and 
polygynous Muslim marriages to be treated as intestate heirs for the 
purpose of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 and to claim 
maintenance from their deceased spouses’ estates under the 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. 
Despite the judiciary’s willingness to recognize and enforce 
proven terms and customs of the Muslim marriage contract, it has not 
been prepared to recognize the marriage itself as valid. Instead, it has 
taken the view that wholesale recognition of Muslim marriages is 
best left to the legislature to address.107 This appears to be in line with 
the judiciary’s hesitance to involve itself in matters of religious 
doctrine.108 Provided that no interpretation relating to religious 
doctrine is required, the judiciary is happy to recognize proven rights 
and obligations emanating from the Muslim marriage contract. Yet, 
this may be a somewhat artificial distinction drawn by the judiciary. 
                                                            
103. See also Cassim v. Cassim, No. 3954/06 (S. Afr. TPD, Dec. 15, 2006). 
104. Mahomed v. Mahomed, No. 2154/08 (S. Afr. ECP, May 29, 2009); 
Hoosain v. Dangor, No. 18141/09, (S. Afr. WCC, Nov. 18, 2009). 
105. 2005 (5) SA 331 (CC) at 341–42, 349–50 (S. Afr.). 
106. 2009 (5) SA 572 (CC) at 589, 593–94 (S. Afr.). 
107. Amod v. Multilateral Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319, at 
1331–32 para. 28 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
108. Ryland v. Edros 1997 (4) LRC 70 (ICHRL) at 703 E–F (S. Afr.). 
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For instance, by recognizing certain aspects of the Muslim marriage 
contract and not recognizing others, as happened in the Ryland case 
where the Court rejected the wife’s claim for an equitable distribution 
of her husband’s estate, the judiciary ends up involving itself in 
religious doctrine even though it may not be engaging in direct 
interpretation of the religion.109 
The judiciary has played a significant role in the last 17 years by 
affording reprieve to especially vulnerable and marginalized Muslim 
women. However, the limitation of judicial intervention in the area of 
Muslim marriages is that it can only provide ad hoc relief. So it is 
understandable that the failure to legislate Muslim marriages appears 
to be causing some frustration to the judiciary as expressed in the 
most recent case, namely, Faro v. Bingham NO and Others.110 The 
wife in the Faro case asked that Muslim marriages be deemed valid 
under the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 or that the common law definition 
of marriage be extended to include Muslim marriages.111 In other 
words, she asked that a Muslim marriage be treated as a secular or 
civil marriage. The Western Cape High Court postponed judgment on 
this claim until August 20, 2014, and has given the Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development until July 15, 2014 to report 
on the progress of the Muslim Marriages Bill (MMB).112 Should 
there not be any significant development on the MMB by that date, 
one wonders if the judiciary will depart from its previous reluctance 
to afford legal recognition to Muslim marriages and allow it to be 
given validity through the Marriage Act? That may put the MMB to 
rest once and for all. But it would still not solve the problem of 
ensuring a religious divorce at the behest of a Muslim wife in 
situations where their husbands refuse to grant one. This latter 
problem is unfortunately a global one in countries with Muslim 
minorities. Thus far, no solution to that particular problem is in sight, 
short of enacting legislation regulating religious divorce as is the case 
in India.113 In other words, there seems to be no escaping the need to 
legislate. 
 
                                                            
109. Amien, supra note 7, at 738. 
110. Faro v. Bingham, No. 4466/2013 (S. Afr. WCC 25 Oct. 2013), 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAWCHC/2013/159.html. 
111. Id. at 7–8 para. 19. The common law definition of marriage is “the legally 
recognized voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of 
all others while it lasts.” Ismail, 1983 (1) SA 1006 (AD) at 1019 H (S. Afr.). 
112. Id. at 21–23 para. 47. 
113. Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, Act. 8, Acts of Parliament, 
1939 (India). 
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VI. THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
There are a number of different types of marriages in South 
Africa, namely, secular or civil marriages, customary marriages, and 
civil partnerships. It could be useful to compare them in thinking 
about the role of religion and its relation to the state and legislature.  
Secular or civil marriages are regulated by the Marriage Act 25 
of 1961, which legislates for marriage between a man and a woman, 
and allows for marriage officers of different religious and humanist 
persuasions.114 In particular, it enables a person who solemnizes or 
officiates inter alia Christian, Hindu, Muslim, and Jewish marriages 
to be registered as a marriage officer. This means that when an imām 
who is designated as a marriage officer, performs a Muslim marriage, 
he or she can simultaneously register a secular or civil marriage. 
Alternatively, a Muslim couple could enter into a secular or civil 
marriage in addition to their Muslim marriage. In these ways, they 
could access the benefits attaching to secular or civil marriages. 
However, very few Muslims enter into secular or civil marriages. 
Prior to 1994, the reason was mainly political in that entering into a 
secular or civil marriage was construed as an act of collaboration 
with an unjust state. After 1994, the reason centred on the religiosity 
of the marriage. Many imāms viewed secular or civil marriages as 
unIslamic because they did not permit polygyny and encompassed a 
default matrimonial regime of community of property. The latter is at 
odds with the mainstream Islamic law approach, which requires a 
complete separation of the spouses’ properties. Thus, most South 
African imāms discouraged their congregations from entering into 
secular or civil marriages and very few allowed themselves to be 
registered as marriage officers.  
However, as recently as May 1, 2014, the Department of Home 
Affairs announced that they had registered more than 100 imāms as 
marriage officers.115 This appears to have been an electioneering 
strategy to elicit Muslim votes for the May 7, 2014 national elections. 
The issue of recognition of Muslim marriages tends to surface every 
five years during the general elections period when politicians use the 
Muslim Marriages Bill (MMB) to canvass for Muslim votes. This 
time, they employed a different strategy and got a significant number 
of imāms to be registered as marriage officers thereby conveying the 
                                                            
114. Marriage Act 25 of 1961 § 3(1) (S. Afr.). 
115. Minister Welcomes Move to Legal Status, CAPE TIMES (South Africa), 
May 1, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 11666067. 
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message to the Muslim community that secular or civil marriages are 
now an Islamically permissible option for them.116 It is still unclear 
how the Department managed to obtain buy-in from the very imāms 
who had previously denounced secular or civil marriages. If one were 
to hazard a calculated guess, one could surmise that the imāms may 
have been persuaded that they would not be precluded from 
officiating polygynous marriages provided the latter are not 
registered under the Marriage Act and they could opt to perform 
secular or civil marriages where the parties have concluded an ante-
nuptial contract regulating their matrimonial regimes as out of 
community of property. In fact, some imāms have announced that 
they will only register secular or civil marriages in cases where 
couples have the aforementioned ante-nuptial contract.  
The precise implications of this recent occurrence of the 
registration of imāms is yet to be determined. At this point, it raises 
the following questions: Will more Muslims now be motivated to 
enter into secular or civil marriages? How will the rights of 
polygynous wives in unregistered marriages weigh against the rights 
of wives in secular or civil marriages? Will those Muslims who enter 
into secular or civil marriages still be able to assert their rights 
emanating from their Muslim marriage? Will Muslims entering into 
secular or civil marriages obfuscate the need for enactment of 
legislation to recognize Muslim marriages? As mentioned in the 
previous section, if the wife wishes to dissolve the marriage through 
divorce, a secular or civil divorce will not guarantee a religious 
divorce. For this, she will still need legislation to recognize and 
regulate Islamic forms of divorce. Alternatively, the ulamā would 
have to accept a secular or civil divorce as sufficient to dissolve the 
Muslim marriage. But is the South African ulamā anywhere near 
ready for such a radical interpretation of what could qualify as a valid 
Muslim divorce? 
In contrast to secular or civil marriages, the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (RCMA) legislates marriages 
concluded under African custom and provides for polygyny in law.117  
The most recent legislation is the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006, which 
legislates civil partnerships, including same-sex couples. 118   
                                                            
116. Id. (noting that 117 imams were qualified as marriage officers). 
117. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 § 2 (S. Afr.). 
118. See Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.). But see Henriét De Ru, The 
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006: A Transformative Act or a Substandard Product of a 
Failed Conciliation Between Social, Legal and Political Issues?, 73 J. CONTEMP. 
ROMAN-DUTCH L. 553, 567–68 (2010) (criticizing the drafting of the Act). 
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Unlike the MMB, attempts to legislate customary marriages 
were effected early in the term of the ANC government. In 1997, the 
South African Law Commission (SALC) proposed legislation to 
recognize customary marriages. The SALC argued that “in certain 
areas, spouses should be free to follow their cultural preferences as 
guaranteed in sections 30 and 31 of the 1996 Constitution,” which 
respectively protect the rights to language and culture and as noted 
previously, of cultural, religious and linguistic communities.119 The 
SALC therefore proposed legislation that would recognize both 
polygynous and monogamous customary marriages, but altered the 
terms of the marriage contract in such a way that would strengthen 
women’s entitlements. For instance, it recommended that a husband 
who intends to enter into a polygynous customary marriage must 
apply to court for approval of the written contract of the subsequent 
marriage and that existing wives be joined in the proceedings.120 
The SALC also suggested that some rules should apply to all 
marriages: consent of both parties; minimum legal age of consent; 
legal equivalence between the parties to a marriage; and some of the 
same terms for divorce. This explains the great degree of similarity 
among the provisions of the different marriage legislation. To use the 
RCMA as an example, with the exception of a few features particular 
to customary marriages such as lobolo, polygyny, and the recognition 
of customary marriage payments, the bulk of the RCMA is a 
reflection of the Marriage Act. This includes the default matrimonial 
property regime of community of property and dissolution of the 
customary marriage being regulated by the Divorce Act. Clearly 
these attempts at assimilation were to enable equality between the 
spouses. However, one of the criticisms leveled at the attempt to 
achieve consistency between the RCMA and secular or civil marriage 
and divorce legislation is that assimilation is normatively problematic 
because it sets the secular or civil marriage legislation as the standard 
to which customary marriages must comply.121 It also introduces 
                                                            
119. J. Mahomed et. al., Harmonisation of the Common Law and the 
Indigenous Law 2 (S. Afr. Law Comm’n, Project 90, Issue Paper No. 3, 1996) 
(“Sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution entitle both individuals and groups to 
practise and participate in the cultural life of their choice, which would include the 
right to live by customary law. Thus, while some rules should apply to all 
marriages, in certain areas spouses should be free to follow their cultural 
preferences.”), available at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/ipapers/ip03_prj90_199 
7.pdf. 
120. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, supra note 117, § 7. 
121. Amien, supra note 34, at 381. 
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practical problems of implementation when the requirements of the 
Marriage Act, which have been subsumed into the RCMA, cannot be 
enforced because they are unfamiliar to the intended beneficiaries 
and do not take their lived realities into account. For example, 
applying to a third party to take a second or subsequent wife is not 
traditional practice for those who enter into customary marriages. 
Thus, in many instances, the applications as required by the RCMA 
are simply not made and husbands proceed to enter into polygynous 
marriages as they did prior to the enactment of the RCMA. 
Furthermore, a large percentage of the black African population who 
enter into customary marriages reside in the rural areas of South 
Africa.122  So even in those instances where husbands do make 
application to court to enter into a subsequent marriage, existing 
wives in rural areas find it too expensive to travel to court to make 
their voices heard.123 Thus, the envisioned protections incorporated 
into the legislation are lost on the intended beneficiaries. 
In contrast, most of the MMB proposes to recognize and regulate 
specific features of Muslim family law that are not unfamiliar to the 
South African Muslim community. There is far less assimilation with 
secular or civil marriage legislation regarding the features and 
requirements for marriage in the MMB than is reflected in the 
RCMA. The MMB displays more of an effort on the part of 
government to be sensitive to the needs and expectations of the 
minority Muslim community. To the extent that consistency between 
the MMB and secular or civil marriage legislation is evident, it 
appears to be mainly for the purpose of achieving administrative 
expediency. For instance, the requirement that the Family Advocates 
Office make recommendations in respect of any minor children born 
of the Muslim marriage is similarly expected in the case of secular or 
civil marriages and African customary marriages. Even then, the 
requirement is tailored to conform to Islamic law by expecting the 
Family Advocate to “take into account Islamic norms and values.”124 
There is a productive comparison to be made across the different 
forms of marriage and the legal, political, and popular deliberations 
around their recognition. One comparison reveals the consequences 
of differences in institutional position and legal entitlement between 
                                                            
122. Debbie Budlender et al., Marriage Patterns in South Africa: 
Methodological and Substantive Issues, 9 S. AFR. J. DEMOGRAPHY 1, 17 (2004). 
123. Chuma Himonga, The Advancement Of African Women’s Rights In The 
First Decade Of Democracy In South Africa: The Reform of the Customary Law of 
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religious and traditional bodies. Many of the issues that drafters faced 
in reconciling religious and traditional marriages and substantive 
gender equality are shared between customary and Muslim personal 
laws. They include polygyny, grounds for divorce, custody, 
inheritance, division of marital estates at divorce, consent, age of 
consent, and women’s legal standing in marriage contracts. As 
observed previously, the legislation drafted for customary and 
Muslim marriages treat some of these issues in similar ways, with a 
core secular or civil law component that prioritizes equality, and 
others that make provision for gender differentiation according to 
religion and tradition. There are further similarities. Women married 
under customary and Muslim rites were prejudiced by the non-
recognition of their marriages. Men claiming authority over their 
traditions—ulamā and traditional leaders respectively—contested the 
authority of the state to transform their traditions. In both cases, an 
alliance of progressive religionists and traditionalists contested their 
patriarchal authority in the name of transformation of tradition and 
gender equality. Both law making processes began in the early years 
of democracy and therefore under similar national political 
conditions. Yet, one concluded soon after its commencement and the 
other has still not been finalized.  
When it came to developing customary marriage legislation, the 
lawmakers followed due process, took comments into account, 
framed a compromise, yet acted against the wishes of the vast 
majority of traditional leaders and gender advocates in passing the 
RCMA. The National and Provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders 
had, on the whole, been extremely critical of the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Bill (RCMA Bill).125  The Commission on 
Gender Equality (CGE), which organized a consultation process with 
rural African women, was also critical, particularly of the provisions 
on polygyny.126  The question of how to deal with polygyny was 
central to the RCMA Bill. As Cheryl Gillwald, then Deputy Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Development said at the launch of the 
RCMA that the polygyny was not banned because such a ban “would 
be almost impossible to enforce and the popularity of the practice 
                                                            
125. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (S. Afr.). 
126. COMM’N ON GENDER EQUALITY, RECOGNITION OF CUSTOMARY 
MARRIAGES BILL SUBMISSION TO JUSTICE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE (1998), 
available at http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/1998/980929cge.htm (The commission 
“rejects the practice of polygamy and regards such practice as discriminatory.”). 
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seems to be waning.”127  Despite this, Budlender and others calculate 
that 7% of married African women report “that their husbands have 
other wives beside themselves.”128 Lack of support for the RCMA 
Bill notwithstanding, the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development pushed it through Parliament and the RCMA was 
enacted in 1998.129   
When it came to developing Muslim marriage legislation, the 
SALRC began in a similar way. They formed a consultative body that 
included a variety of opinions among Muslims, followed due process, 
took comments into account and then framed a compromise. 
However, they did not act against the wishes of those Muslims who 
were opposed to the compromise. Instead, they acknowledged the 
autonomy of the “Muslim community” in deciding on this matter. 
They gave cognisance to the idea of the sacred authority of the 
Qur’ān and were unwilling to codify elements of scripture in 
opposition to its claimed authoritative interpretation. But it was only 
by withdrawing from the legislative process that they could do this. 
How then to explain the different outcomes between the 
processes relating to the enactment of the RCMA and the still 
pending enactment of the MMB, which is causing Muslim marriages 
to continue to operate outside the ambit of state law? The difference 
is a direct result of relations between the state and religious and 
traditional bodies respectively. In the case of customary law, it was 
codified by colonial administrators, legislated by apartheid 
administrators, and now again, codified through the RCMA. In other 
words, the institution of traditional leadership and customary law 
were part of the state and its law. As such, they are uniquely subject 
to legislative development, and therefore, to the equality provisions. 
They do not have autonomy from the state.  
What then of MPL? The ideas of religious autonomy, 
conscience, and a separation of powers and domains have been 
central to the development of secularism. These ideas were defended 
by both the ANC and religious groups in the negotiations. The 
constitutional right to religion includes the right to the integrity of 
conscience. Religious organizations as institutions of civil society 
have the right to autonomous ecclesiastical and theological control 
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over their internal rules and regulations. Religious groups sought 
separation from the state so that their ecclesiastical and theological 
control could remain autonomous. As long as a social practice or 
institution does not seek the authorization of the state; as long as no-
one takes this practice to court; and as long as an organization can 
claim to be a religion with a domain of autonomy through conscience 
or sacred authority, the state has not legislated religious practices to 
bring them in line with equality provisions. But the moment a 
practice or institution falls under the rubric of legislation, equality 
becomes an issue. The ordination of women in church, for example, 
is a matter of ecclesiastical and theological autonomy. Unless 
someone takes it to court, and perhaps even then, the state is unlikely 
to intervene. On the contrary, access of women to chieftainship, for 
example, has been both proactively legislated and contested in 
court.130 It seems that the state is more inclined to intervene when the 
conduct or practice is cultural rather than religious in nature. 
The above examples of marriage legislation also point to the 
different avenues open for the legislation of majoritarian and 
countermajoritarian demands. Unpopular demands for equality that 
are in opposition to public opinion have been taken to court. This is 
most clear in the advancement of equal rights for gay and lesbian 
people who won their demands through the courts.131 It put enormous 
pressure on the ANC at a time when it sought to defend itself against 
claims of immorality. It is clear that the executive branch of the ANC 
had to override the “popular” will represented in the views of 
members of parliament to support the Civil Union Act. The question 
of Muslim marriages on the other hand, which affects a small 
minority, has been dealt with in specially established forums of 
lawyers and specialists. The state has not yet been willing to 
intervene to force a resolution in favour of one or another position. 
    CONCLUSION 
The South African example presenting an attempt to legislate a 
religious marriage regime in a secular democracy points to many 
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tensions in the place of religion under law. The South African Bill of 
Rights guarantees a right of religious freedom. It also limits and 
frames this right. Turning a right into a legislative and social reality is 
a far more complex and ambivalent process. As we have shown, the 
success of such a process depends on the levels of consensus among 
religious representatives, claims to religious legitimacy and authority, 
negotiations between public and private presence of religion, and 
political will in relation to religious minorities.  
The tension between secular or civil recognition of Muslim 
marriages as contracts in the courts and the non-recognition of 
Muslim marriages under legislation is increasing. It will be 
interesting to watch developments in this area over the next few 
months or years. Whichever way the process goes, it is clear that 
there is a process of de-facto secularization of Muslim marriages 
recognized as a secular or civil contract. This goes some way towards 
removing the exceptionalism of religious systems of law. As an 
increasingly large body of literature shows, any legal recognition of 
religious law is at the same time a process of its reformulation.  
